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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This case requires us to consider the scope of respondeat 
superior liability for hostile work environment claims 
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a)(1). Karen Kunin, an employee at Sears 
Roebuck & Co., alleged that a co-worker had harassed her 
over a three-week period by using sexually derogatory 
language. Kunin did not report the harassment, however, to 
Sears' management until the end of the period, and instead 
during the period only asked her supervisor the general 
question of whether "cursing" was permitted in the 
workplace. Because we conclude that an employee provides 
notice to the employer only when he or she complains 
about sexually offensive conduct, and because Sears had 
neither actual nor constructive notice of the harassment 
until the end of the three-week period, we will reverse the 
district court's denial of Sears' motion for judgment as a 
matter of law and will remand for entry of judgment in 
Sears' favor. 
 
The district court had federal question jurisdiction over 
Kunin's Title VII sexual harassment claim against Sears 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1331 and 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(f)(3). 
Because the district court entered final judgment after a 
jury verdict, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.S 1291. 
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
A. Factual History 
 
Kunin worked as a salesperson for Sears at its 
Neshaminy Mall store in Bensalem, Pennsylvania, from 
1987 to 1996. This lawsuit arises from alleged sexual 
harassment that Kunin experienced at that store from a 
fellow employee, Randy Lodato. 
 
In March 1996, Sears transferred Kunin, at her request, 
to its division 26/46, major appliances. Approximately one 
month later, on April 28, Lodato began to work in the same 
department, where Kunin was the only woman. Kunin 
quickly began to experience problems working with Lodato 
because of his regular use of profanity, which included 
directing the term "fucking bitch" at her personally. She 
testified at trial that Lodato used vulgar language on every 
occasion that she worked with him and was unresponsive 
to her requests to stop his offensive conduct. In one 
instance, Lodato responded to Kunin's complaints by 
stating that she "must be virgin ears" and would have to 
grow accustomed to his language or return to her previous 
department. Kunin's fellow employees confirmed at trial 
that Lodato regularly used profanity, and that they had 
witnessed him direct the profanity, including the term 
"fucking bitch," at Kunin. 
 
Because of Lodato's unresponsiveness, Kunin took the 
opportunity to speak with a supervisor in early May. With 
Lodato following her, Kunin approached her supervisor, 
George Kerper, while he was on the sales floor of her 
department and asked: "is cursing allowed on the sales 
floor?" Kerper, who was working on a computer at the time, 
replied "no," but asked no follow up questions and turned 
his back to Kunin. At that time, Kunin did not inform 
Kerper specifically that Lodato was using vulgar language 
that offended her. 
 
The conflict between Kunin and Lodato came to a head 
on May 18, 1996, less than two weeks after Kunin had 
approached Kerper on the sales floor. Kunin testified that 
on that day Lodato yelled at her to stop approaching the 
customers in their department, even though she regularly 
had observed male employees doing so. After this 
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disagreement, Kunin witnessed Lodato gesturing to their 
fellow employees. When she inquired about what had been 
said, she learned that Lodato had referred to her as a 
"fucking bitch and dumb cunt." Refusing to ignore such 
conduct, Kunin approached Lodato and informed him that 
she would not be intimidated. After Lodato continued to 
curse her, she paged supervisor Kerper and asked him to 
come to the sales floor. Kerper and Kunin went outside the 
store where Kunin informed him of the demeaning language 
that Lodato had directed at her and asked Kerper "to stop 
it now." Kerper replied that the store manager, Robert 
Dugan, who would not return for two days, would have to 
address the situation. Upon entering the store, however, 
Kerper instructed Lodato to stay away from Kunin, an 
instruction that Lodato followed. 
 
Shortly after her discussion with Kerper, Kunin's shift 
ended and she prepared to leave the store. Unexpectedly, 
however, on her way out she encountered her boyfriend, 
David Eldridge, and his adult son. She recounted the day's 
events to Eldridge, and they then proceeded through the 
store to his truck, which was parked outside. As they 
passed through Kunin's department, Eldridge approached a 
group of male employees and, after asking who was Lodato, 
jabbed Lodato in the shoulder. A screaming match then 
ensued, and eventually store employees summoned both 
store security and the police. One of the employees that 
witnessed the incident testified at trial that Kunin had a 
smile on her face when Eldridge confronted Lodato. 
 
After investigating the May 18 incident, Sears terminated 
Lodato and Kunin and issued a reprimand to Kerper. Sears 
fired Lodato because he admitted to using improper 
language in the workplace, and terminated Kunin because 
of her "failure to discourage a situation that led to physical 
violence and threats of violence directed at Randy Lodato." 
Kerper's reprimand faulted him for failing to deal with the 
situation between Lodato and Kunin "in a decisive manner," 
thus causing it to "flare up." Believing that she had suffered 
sexual harassment and that Sears had fired her because of 
her complaints about such treatment, Kunin filed suit in 
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the district court on July 14, 1997, alleging that Sears had 
violated Title VII.1 
 
B. Procedural History 
 
After discovery, Sears moved for summary judgment on 
Kunin's sexual harassment and retaliation claims, but the 
district court denied its motion on December 5, 1997. 
Although stating that the evidence supporting Kunin's 
claims did not appear "overwhelming," the court found that 
because many of the issues boiled down to "he said, she 
said" disputes, the entry of summary judgment was  
inappropriate.2 
 
The case was tried to a jury on December 8, 9, and 10, 
1997. At the end of Kunin's case and at the end of all of the 
evidence, Sears unsuccessfully moved for a judgment as a 
matter of law. At the close of the trial, the jury returned a 
verdict in Kunin's favor on the sexual harassment claim 
and awarded her $38,000 for pain and suffering. Although 
it found in Sears' favor on the retaliation claim, the jury 
nevertheless awarded Kunin $75,000 in front pay damages. 
 
Sears filed post-trial motions renewing its request for a 
judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative, a new 
trial with respect to the sexual harassment verdict and the 
damages award. In particular, it argued that Kunin had 
failed to establish the elements of a sexual harassment 
claim and that the jury's award of front pay was 
inconsistent with its conclusion that Sears did not retaliate 
against Kunin in terminating her. The district court again 
denied Sears' motions, stating first that viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to Kunin, it found that 
she had established every element of a sexual harassment 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Kunin's complaint included other claims of sex discrimination, such 
as the allegation that Sears had assigned to its female employees lower 
paying jobs than it had assigned to its male employees. During a pre- 
trial hearing, however, Kunin stated that she would pursue only the 
claims that Lodato had sexually harassed her and that Sears had fired 
her in retaliation for reporting such harassment. 
 
2. Sears' appeal includes the claim that the district court erred in not 
granting it summary judgment. Even if we could consider that argument, 
we have no reason to do so. 
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claim. Next, the court stated that it was an issue of first 
impression in this circuit whether a plaintiff who had been 
discharged, rather than constructively discharged, could 
recover front pay where a jury found sexual harassment 
but not retaliatory discharge. The court upheld the front 
pay award for two reasons. First, it stated that the award 
showed that the jury had "found a causal connection 
between the defendant's wrongful conduct and plaintiff's 
discharge, despite its finding of no retaliation." Although 
finding the causal link "somewhat attenuated," the court 
noted that "[a] defendant is generally liable for all harm 
flowing from its wrongful conduct," and that it was 
"unaware of any rule of law precluding an award of 
damages where the but-for causes of a discharge were 
multifactorial." Second, the court found that it would be 
"contrary to the purposes of Title VII to hold that a plaintiff 
who is discharged because of circumstances arising out of 
sexual harassment cannot collect front pay damages, 
whereas a plaintiff who walks out of her job can be 
awarded such damages." Based on its reasons for 
upholding the front pay award, the court then also granted 
Kunin's motion for back pay in the amount of $46,741.42. 
 
Sears appeals, raising three alleged errors. First, it 
argues that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
on Kunin's sexual harassment claim because the evidence, 
even when viewed in the light most favorable to Kunin, 
failed to establish "regular and pervasive" harassment and 
respondeat superior liability on Sears' part. Second, it 
claims that awards of front and back pay are unfounded 
legally where a jury concludes that an employer did not act 
based on a discriminatory motive in firing the employee. 
Finally, Sears contends that the district court erred in 
admitting evidence of previous complaints Kunin made to 
Sears management about issues unrelated to her sexual 
harassment claims. Because we find Sears' argument that 
Kunin failed to prove respondeat superior liability 
compelling, we do not address its other assertions.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Our failure to discuss these other claims should not be interpreted as 
in any way reflecting our judgment about their merit. 
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III. DISCUSSION4 
 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful 
for an employer "to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. S 2000e- 
2(a)(1). It is well established that a plaintiff can 
demonstrate a violation of Title VII by proving that sexual 
harassment created a hostile or abusive work environment. 
See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66, 106 S.Ct. 
2399, 2405 (1986). 
 
According to our precedent, to succeed in a sexual 
harassment claim based on a hostile work environment, the 
plaintiff must show five elements: 
 
       (1) the employee[ ] suffered intentional discrimination 
       because of [her] sex; (2) the discrimination was 
       pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimination 
       detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the 
       discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable 
       person of the same sex in that position; and (5) the 
       existence of respondeat superior liability. 
 
Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d 
Cir. 1990).5 The district court instructed the jury pursuant 
to this standard and the parties do not question that this 
standard applies to this case. The central dispute in this 
appeal concerns the fifth factor in the Andrews test, the 
existence of respondeat superior liability. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We review under a plenary standard Sears' claim that the district 
court erred in denying it judgment as a matter of law after the trial, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Kunin in order to 
determine whether there was "insufficient evidence from which a jury 
reasonably could find liability." Shade v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 
154 F.3d 143, 149 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
5. In Williamson v. City of Houston, 148 F.3d 462, 465 (5th Cir. 1998), 
the court pointed out that an employer's liability for co-workers' sexual 
harassment is direct not vicarious so that the use of the term 
"respondeat superior" in such a case may not be appropriate. We need 
not pursue this point as "respondeat superior" in the context here 
connotes notice to the employer and we decide the case on that basis. 
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An employer is not always liable for a hostile work 
environment. Instead, under Andrews, "liability exists 
where the defendant knew or should have known of the 
harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action." 895 
F.2d at 1486 (citations omitted). Although the evidence 
establishes that Kunin provided notice of harassment, be it 
sexual or not, to supervisor Kerper on May 18, 1996, 6 this 
notice did not establish respondeat superior liability 
because Kerper took effective action as he instructed 
Lodato to stay away from Kunin who experienced no further 
harassment from Lodato. Our precedents provide that when 
an employer's response stops harassment, there cannot be 
Title VII liability. See Bouton v. BMW of N. America, Inc., 29 
F.3d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1994) ("By definition, there is no 
negligence if the [sexual harassment grievance] procedure is 
effective."). Thus, Sears will be liable to Kunin only if she 
can establish that Sears had notice of harassment prior to 
May 18 and yet failed to take adequate steps to stop it. 
 
Kunin argues that by asking Kerper in early May whether 
"cursing was allowed on the sales floor," she provided Sears 
management with notice of sexual harassment. Because 
Kunin did not complain specifically that Lodato, or any 
employee, was harassing her, her interaction with Kerper 
does not constitute actual notice to Sears. The question 
posed, therefore, is whether Kunin's query to Kerper was 
sufficient to place him and thus Sears on constructive 
notice of the harassment. 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has stated that 
"the type and extent of notice necessary to impose liability 
on an employer under Title VII are the subject of some 
uncertainty." Williamson v. City of Houston, 148 F.3d 462, 
465 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). Indeed, our research 
has revealed a limited number of cases interpreting the 
doctrine of constructive notice as it relates to sexual 
harassment claims. These cases suggest that there can be 
constructive notice in two situations: where an employee 
provides management level personnel with enough 
information to raise a probability of sexual harassment in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Sears has not questioned in this case that notice to Kunin's 
supervisor, Kerper, would have constituted notice to Sears itself. 
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the mind of a reasonable employer, or where the 
harassment is so pervasive and open that a reasonable 
employer would have had to be aware of it. See, e.g., 
Zimmerman v. Cook County Sheriff's Dep't, 96 F.3d 1017, 
1018-19 (7th Cir. 1996). We believe that these standards 
strike the correct balance between protecting the rights of 
the employee and the employer by faulting the employer for 
turning a blind eye to overt signs of harassment but not 
requiring it to attain a level of omniscience, in the absence 
of actual notice, about all misconduct that may occur in 
the workplace. The proof offered by Kunin in this case falls 
short of these standards. 
 
Standing alone, Kunin's interaction with Kerper in early 
May was not enough to place him on notice that there was 
a reasonable probability of sexual harassment. Although 
Kunin's question arguably suggested that she was having 
difficulty with a fellow employee's language, her use of the 
word "cursing" did not communicate that the offensive 
language had sexual overtones. Courts have found that 
when employees' complaints do not refer to sexually 
offensive behavior, employers are not on constructive notice 
of sexual harassment. See, e.g., Murray v. New York Univ. 
College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 250 (2d Cir. 1995) (ruling 
that dental student's complaint to supervising doctor that 
a clinic patient was "staring at [her] and trying to get her 
attention," was insufficient to put university on notice 
under Title IX that student was being sexually harassed 
because it did not inform the university's agent that the 
patient's conduct was of "an ongoing sexually offensive 
nature."); Schiraldi v. Ampco Sys. Parking, 9 F. Supp.2d 
213, 216, 220 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that employee's 
complaints that co-worker "wouldn't leave her alone" and 
called her "names" were insufficient to provide employer 
with constructive notice because "they gave no indication 
that [the offensive] actions were in any way sexual"). 
 
Kunin argues, however, that her interaction with Kerper 
in early May was not the only indication that Lodato was 
posing a problem for her. Instead, she points out that 
Kerper admitted at trial that he had heard rumors about 
offensive language in his department but never had 
investigated them. This argument encounters the same 
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obstacle as Kunin's preceding claim: there is simply no 
evidence that Kerper had knowledge that the rude language 
was gender-specific. 
 
Moving to the second type of situation that can support 
a finding of constructive notice, we now consider whether 
the harassment alleged by Kunin was so open and 
pervasive that a reasonable employer could not have been 
ignorant of it. See Zimmerman, 96 F.3d at 1018-19. In 
analyzing the pervasiveness of the alleged harassment, we 
note first and foremost that the harassment occurred over 
a short time, from April 28, when Lodato first began 
working with Kunin, to May 18, the day of Lodato's 
altercation with Kunin's boyfriend. Further, it is clear from 
the record that Kunin and Lodato did not work together 
every day during these key three weeks; instead, they 
would have interacted only on days that their shifts 
overlapped. Thus, because of this short time period and the 
limited number of interactions between Lodato and Kunin, 
Sears' management had little opportunity to discover the 
harassment absent Kunin's giving the company actual 
notice. Cf. Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1016, 
1018 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding that even if supervisor was not 
aware of all sexual abuse, "unrelenting pattern of verbal, 
physical and psychic abuse" involved incidents"so 
numerous" that employer was "liable for failing to discover 
what was going on and to take remedial steps to put an end 
to it"). 
 
Moreover, the harassment in this case was not of the 
kind that would have been easily discoverable by Sears' 
management. Lodato had not posted demeaning images or 
statements about women for all to see. Cf. Lipsett v. 
University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 888, 906 n.25 (1st 
Cir. 1988) (finding notice possible in suit brought under 
Title IX and 42 U.S.C. S 1983 where male surgical residents 
had posted Playboy centerfolds in location where all 
residents ate their meals). Instead, he made derogatory 
remarks to Kunin personally, apparently at times when 
management was not within hearing range. Although we in 
no way mean to condone Lodato's conduct, we simply 
cannot find that Sears is liable in the circumstances here. 
Given the brief time period in which Kunin and Lodato 
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worked together, the limited number of instances that the 
offensive conduct could have occurred, and the fleeting 
nature of derogatory language, Sears reasonably failed to 
discover the harassment alleged by Kunin. Because Kunin 
cannot show respondeat superior liability, the fifth factor in 
the Andrews test, her sexual harassment claim against 
Sears must fail. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
We will reverse the district court's denial of judgment as 
a matter of law to Sears on Kunin's sexual harassment 
claim as well as the judgment for all monetary damages, 
and we will remand the case to the district court with 
directions to vacate the judgment in Kunin's favor and 
enter judgment as a matter of law in Sears' favor. 
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